Security, Trust & Platform
Account-based tenancy as the isolation boundary, separated platform and customer RBAC, Clerk-managed identity with MFA, SOC2-ready immutable audit logging on every mutating action, a governed data pipeline that refuses to fabricate a number when its source isn't wired, and a scoped partner API.
The problem
"Every trade-compliance tool we've evaluated is a single-tenant app someone bolted a login onto."
Tenancy
"Who at the vendor can see our data? Can their support team just look? We need an immutable audit trail for SOC2 and CBP."
Access & audit
"Half these 'AI trade platforms' are making up sanctions data and duty rates. How do we know your numbers are real?"
Data integrity
How Qubere addresses it
Tenancy, RBAC & row-level security
Not a view filter, not a middleware afterthought. Auth (identity, MFA, sessions) is Clerk; authorization (roles, permissions) is in Postgres. Within an account, a staff-tier user sees only the clients they are assigned to — and the AI assistant inherits that because it's the same code path.
| Permission | ACCOUNT_ADMIN | ACCOUNT_MANAGER | ACCOUNT_STAFF | ACCOUNT_VIEWER |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| filings.submit | ✓ | ✓ | — | — |
| decisions.approve | ✓ | ✓ | own | — |
| documents.create | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | — |
| compliance.override | ✓ | — | — | — |
| shipments.read | all | all | assigned only | all |
SOC2-ready immutable audit log
Every administrative and mutating action writes an AuditLog entry: accountId, userId, action, entity, metadata, IP, user-agent, request-id, success/failure. Best-effort write path — a logging failure never blocks or rolls back the action. Shared by every module against a ~104-entry catalogue.
| Time | Action | Actor | IP | OK |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 14:02:11 | ROLE_ASSIGNED | joe@target.com | 72.14.x.x | ✓ |
| 13:41:07 | FILING_TRANSMITTED | s.chen@target.com | 72.14.x.x | ✓ |
| 11:22:03 | USER_INVITED | joe@target.com | 72.14.x.x | ✓ |
| 09:15:40 | ACCOUNT_SETTING_CHANGED | joe@target.com | 72.14.x.x | ✓ |
Zero-Fabrication data pipeline
60+ reference datasets, each with an explicit LIVE or NOT_YET_IMPLEMENTED status. Un-wired datasets return HTTP 422 and never fake success. A new HTS revision is staged DRAFT and never auto-published — duty rates feed real filings, so a person publishes. One daily dispatcher fans out to all LIVE datasets by their own cadence; staleness fires alerts.
| Dataset | State | Source | Last success |
|---|---|---|---|
| HTSUS Schedule | LIVE | hts.usitc.gov | 08:04 · staged DRAFT |
| OFAC SDN + non-SDN | LIVE | treasury (Inngest job) | 02:11 |
| BIS Consolidated Screening | LIVE | data.trade.gov | 02:14 |
| USITC AD/CVD Orders | NOT_YET_IMPLEMENTED | — | 422 on request |
| GSP Eligible Products List | NOT_YET_IMPLEMENTED | — | 422 on request |
Partner API & Platform Admin Console
/api/v1/* routes authenticated by API key (Bearer / X-Api-Key), per-scope, idempotent, every action audit-logged source: "API". Screening, classification, HTS, products, parties, regulatory, rulings, trade agreements, batch.
For the security review
Objection handling
| "SOC2 report?" | The architecture is SOC2-ready — immutable audit, RBAC, tenant isolation, least-privilege data access. Position readiness and the design; get the formal attestation status from sales ops, don't improvise it. |
| "Can we self-host / air-gap?" | The apps are Next.js; the document worker runs as a long-lived process on any host. A fully air-gapped deployment isn't a packaged offering — scope it as an enterprise engagement. |
| "Data deletion / export on termination?" | Bulk shipment/document export exists. A formal end-of-contract data-return/purge runbook is an enterprise contract item, not a self-serve button. |
The close
Next step: send us your security questionnaire. We'll walk it line by line against the Platform Admin Console on a screen-share — and show you the dataset registry and the audit log live.
Full detail: docs/apps/customs/sales/security-trust-and-platform.md · README §1–6